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I. INTRODUCTION
The Robinson-Patman Act is the black sheep of antitrust. Like
much other New Deal legislation, the principal purpose of the Robinson-
Patman Act (the Act) was protectionist.' Instead of trying to enhance
competition for the benefit of consumers, like other antitrust laws, the
Act's predominant goal was to protect small business from competition.2
It did this by tightening the 1914 Clayton Act proscriptions against "sec-
ondary-line" discrimination-discrimination by a seller that favors some
of its customers over others.3 Congress was concerned that large buyers
1 Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law; Co-Editor, Research in Law and Econom-
ics; and Member, Board of Advisors, American Antitrust Institute. I presented an earlier version of
this article at the 2006 Spring Meeting of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association.
Alicia Downey, Stephen Cemak, and Heather Kirkwood commented on that version. Heather Kirk-
wood, Anthony Kirkwood, and the editors of this review suggested numerous improvements in this
version.
1. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929-45, 371 (1999) (showing that in many areas of the economy, "the New Deal's
technique was . . . to suppress competition, or at least to modulate its destructive effects"). One
example was the "Robinson-Patman Act of 1936," the prohibitions of which were "a way of insulat-
ing 'mom-and-pop' comer stores against aggressive price pressure from the high-volume giants."
Id. at 372.
2. Terry Calvani and Gilde Breidenbach state: "It is quite clear that the underlying predicate of
the Robinson-Patman Act was not consumer welfare. Rather, the Act is protectionist legislation."
Terry Calvani & Gilde Breidenbach, An Introduction to the Robinson-Patman Act and Its Enforce-
ment by the Government, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 770 (1991). Terry Calvani, a former Commis-
sioner of the Federal Trade Commission, authored the Commission decision in In re General Motors
Corp., 103 F.T.C. 641 (1984), which came to the same conclusion. The Act contains elements that
soften its protectionist thrust, including a cost-justification defense, see 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (2006),
and a meeting competition defense, see 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006).
3. Most significantly, Congress added language to Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a), that relaxed the injury requirement in a secondary-line case. Under the new language, a
plaintiff could prevail by proving that the discrimination reduced its ability to compete, even if over-
all competition remained vigorous. See, e.g., Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., Ill F.3d 653,
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could force sellers to give them lower prices and other benefits and then
use these advantages to take business or profits from smaller firms. 4 By
curbing secondary-line discrimination, the Act helped protect small busi-
ness from the aggressive competition of powerful buyers. At the same
time, it reduced the ability of those buyers to extract lower prices from
their suppliers and pass them on to consumers.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly narrowed the
conflict between the Act and other antitrust laws. Between 1979 and
1993, the Court decided four Robinson-Patman Act cases and in all four
adopted interpretations that made it harder for plaintiffs to prevail, either
by "expanding affirmative defenses [or] heightening requirements for a
prima facie case. ''5 In Brooke Group, the last of the four, the Court reit-
erated its admonition that the Act should be construed "consistently with
broader policies of the antitrust laws.",6 In addition, the Court specifically
declared that the Act bans "price discrimination only to the extent that it
threatens to injure competition.",7 If taken literally, this statement would
eliminate the protectionist purpose of the Act, making secondary-line
discrimination illegal only when a plaintiff could show a threat to
market-wide competition.
After Brooke Group, defendants frequently argued that the state-
ment should be read literally. The appellate courts rejected this argument,
however, finding it difficult to believe that the Supreme Court meant to
eviscerate what Congress had done in 1936. 8 The Supreme Court itself
655 (9th Cir. 1997) (this language "shifts the focus of the statute from protecting competition to
protecting individual disfavored buyers from the loss of business to favored buyers").
4. In FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948), the Supreme Court declared: "The legis-
lative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to
be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because
of the large buyer's quantity-purchasing advantage." Morton Salt also recognized that liability under
the Act could be established merely by showing injury to the "competitor victimized by the dis-
crimination." Id. at 49.
5. Elaine Foreman and Robert Skitol, Volvo v. Reeder: Narrow Holding, Broader Implications,
theantitrustsource (March 2006), at 1, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/
06/O3/MarO6-Skitol3=22f.pdf. The four cases were Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509
U.S. 209 (1993); Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990); Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco
Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983); and Great All. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979). In
three of the four cases, the Court ruled for the defendants; the plaintiff prevailed only in Hasbrouck.
6. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 220 (quoting Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80
n.13 (1979)).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Chroma Lighting, Ill F.3d at 653. See also Richard M. Steuer, Bidding for a
Rational Robinson-Patman Act, 20 ANTITRUST 61, 67 (2006) ("[C]ourts in six circuits refused to
apply Brooke Group's injury to competition standard beyond primary-line cases."). The appellate
courts were able to distinguish Brooke Group because, as Steuer points out, it was a "primary-line"
case, not a secondary-line case. See id In a primary-line case, the plaintiff is a competitor of the
discriminating seller; in a secondary-line case, the plaintiff is a customer of the discriminating seller.
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did not address the issue again until thirteen years later when it decided
Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.9 in 2006.
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Act interpretation-whether the Act applies to a competitive bidding
situation-the most interesting and important aspect of the decision was
whether the Court would follow Brooke Group and eliminate the conflict
between the Act and other antitrust laws.
In this article, I address that broader question. In Part 1I, I summa-
rize the facts and opinions in Volvo, particularly the final section of the
majority opinion where the Court observed that Volvo's discrimination
was procompetitive. In Part III, I review the growing consensus in anti-
trust law that the fundamental goal of the antitrust statutes (other than the
Robinson-Patman Act) is to promote consumer welfare. Today when
most courts say that a practice furthers competition, they mean that it
improves consumer welfare-specifically, the welfare of consumers in
the relevant market. In Part IV, I use that interpretation of furthering
competition to test the Court's view that Volvo's price discrimination
was procompetitive. I conclude that the Court was probably correct be-
cause it is likely that Volvo's conduct benefited users of trucks. Finally,
in Part V, I confront the ultimate question: did Volvo impose new stan-
dards for secondary-line liability that would require all future Robinson-
Patman Act plaintiffs, not just primary-line plaintiffs, to show probable
harm to consumer welfare? I conclude that it did not: while Volvo is not
entirely clear, the Court's decision does not appear to jettison any of the
basic protectionist features of the Act. Instead, it strengthens the Court's
existing, incrementalist approach under which issues of Robinson-
Patman Act interpretation are resolved in ways that promote competition
and consumer welfare. Where there is an issue of statutory interpreta-
tion-as there will be in any case the Court takes-the Court is likely to
choose the interpretation of the Act that best advances the interests of
consumers. Where a plaintiff has brought a completely traditional secon-
dary-line case, however, the Court still appears unwilling to rule that the
plaintiff must show harm to market-wide competition.
II. THE VOLVO DECISION
Volvo presented a significant question of Robinson-Patman Act in-
terpretation because it involved a competitive bidding situation rather
than the usual secondary-line setting. In the usual secondary-line setting,
See infra note 28. The issue remained alive, however, because the Court's controversial statement in
Brooke Group was not expressly limited to primary-line cases. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 220.
9. 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006).
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the favored and disfavored customers have already purchased the defen-
dant's products, and thereafter, hold the products in inventory to compete
with each other in reselling these products.'0 In Volvo, however, the ul-
timate consumers-end users of trucks-sought competitive bids from
dealers for truck manufacturers and then purchased from the dealer offer-
ing the best bid." Such a competitive bidding situation led neither
Reeder, the plaintiff, nor the asserted favored customers to sell from their
inventory. 12 Instead, they bought trucks from Volvo only after they won
a bid to supply trucks to a particular end user.' 3 Thus, even in instances
in which two Volvo dealers were competing for the business of a particu-
lar end user, only one dealer was a reseller of Volvo trucks-the dealer
who won the bid.
14
In this particular setting, it might be impossible for a plaintiff to
establish a Robinson-Patman Act violation. Relying on the statutory lan-
guage, most commentators state that a secondary-line price discrimina-
tion violation requires two sales-one at a higher price and one at a
lower price-to competing resellers. 15 While these elements are satisfied
in the usual secondary-line setting, they are arguably not met in a com-
petitive bidding contest. In Volvo, Reeder never identified another Volvo
dealer who purchased Volvo trucks at a better price than Reeder received
(meeting the "two sales" requirement) and resold them in competition
with Reeder (meeting the "competing resellers" requirement).16
The Supreme Court could have resolved Volvo relatively easily,
therefore, by agreeing with Volvo and the Solicitor General that a secon-
dary-line case cannot be brought in a competitive bidding situation. The
Court did not do this.' 7 Nor did the majority end its opinion once it con-
cluded that Reeder did not satisfy the standards that might permit a plain-
tiff to prevail in a competitive bidding situation. Instead, the Court added
a final section to its opinion in which it addressed the relationship of its
10. See generally FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
11. 126 S. Ct. at 866-68.
12. See id
13. Id.
14. In fact, Volvo dealers did not generally compete with other Volvo dealers; rather, they
typically bid against dealers for other truck manufacturers. See Steuer, supra note 8, at 61 (truck
users "rarely solicited bids from more than one Volvo dealer, and Reeder rarely bid against another
Volvo dealer").
15. See, e.g., Allen M. Huss, Presentation, The Elements of Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, American Bar Association Antitrust Section Meeting, Spring 2006, at 3 (the
elements of unlawful price discrimination include "[t]wo sales," a "price discrimination," and "com-
peting resellers") (on file with the author).
16. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 866-68.
17. See id at 869-73.
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decision to the procompetitive policies of the other antitrust laws.18 The
basic facts on which the Court erected its analysis were straightforward
and undisputed.
A. Facts
Volvo manufactures heavy-duty trucks. 19 It distributes its trucks
through a network of franchised dealers, who then supply them to
Volvo's retail customers--end users such as trucking firms and dairies. 20
In order to bid for the business of an end user, a Volvo dealer would ask
Volvo for a discount off Volvo's list price.2 1 According to Volvo, the
discount it was willing to give off its list price depended on the
competitive situation it faced. 2 If two Volvo dealers wanted to bid for
the business of the same customer, Volvo's policy was to grant them
both the same discount.23
Reeder was a Volvo dealer in Arkansas who alleged that its sales
and profits fell because Volvo gave other dealers better discounts than it
received.24 According to Reeder, Volvo wanted to reduce the size of its
dealership network but could not terminate Reeder because it would risk
liability under Arkansas franchise law.2 5 As a result, Reeder asserted,
Volvo decided to eliminate Reeder by discriminating against it.26 Reeder
principally measured its losses by comparing the discounts it received on
bids to supply certain end users to the discounts other Volvo dealers re-
ceived on bids to supply different end users.27 Reeder could identify only
two instances where another Volvo dealer had allegedly received a better
discount than Reeder to supply the same end user.28 And in both in-
stances, there was evidence that Volvo had not in fact discriminated
against Reeder.29
18. Part IV is the most intriguing and provocative part of Volvo since, standing alone, it could
be read to apply Brooke Group to secondary-line cases. Read in connection with Parts 11 and III of
the opinion, however, it does not appear that the Court has taken this step.
19. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 866.
20. Id. at 866-67.
21. Id. at 866. Volvo's list price depended on the specifications for the trucks in question. Id.
22. For example, Volvo tended to grant a smaller discount if the end user had been a long-
standing Volvo customer and a larger discount if the end user had to be persuaded to switch from
another manufacturer. See Brief for Petitioner Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. at 3, Volvo Trucks N.
Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2005) (No. 04-905) [hereinafter Petitioner
Brief]. See also Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 866-67.
23. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 867.
24. Id. at 866.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.C. I. See also Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 867.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 1. See also Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 867.
27. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 867.
28. Id.
29. See id.
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
B. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority,30 Justice Ginsburg proceeded in two
stages. First, in Parts 11 and Il1, she ruled that Reeder's case was deficient
as a matter of law. Then, in Part IV, she indicated that even if Reeder had
offered a permissible interpretation of the Act, the Court would have re-
jected it because it would have penalized procompetitive behavior. In
neither stage did the Court conclude that it was ready to discard the Act's
long-standing competitive injury test and replace it with a requirement
that a secondary-line plaintiff must show harm to market-wide competi-
tion and consumer welfare.
1. Resolution of Reeder's Claims
Justice Ginsburg began her analysis by laying out the contours of a
secondary-line price discrimination violation in Part II of her opinion,
and market-wide competition injury was not within those contours. She
noted that the Act does not bar all price differences; rather, the Act "pro-
scribes price discrimination only to the extent that it threatens to injure
competition., 31 Although Justice Ginsburg quoted the controversial lan-
guage from Brooke Group, the context of Part II indicates she apparently
utilized the quote only to make clear that a plaintiff in a secondary-line
case cannot prevail merely by establishing that it paid more than another
customer for the defendant's product; she was not referring to a need to
prove market-wide competition. In addition, the plaintiff must also show
32that this disadvantage threatened to cause some injury to competition.
The three sentences following the quote made it evident that the kind of
injury to competition she was referring to was injury to competition
among the favored and disfavored customers, not injury to market-wide
competition. More specifically, she stated in these sentences that there
are "three categories of competitive injury that may give rise to a Robin-
son-Patman claim"3 3 and that the second category, secondary-line injury,
30. In Volvo, seven Justices concluded that Reeder had not proven sufficient facts to establish a
Robinson-Patman Act violation (Justice Ginsburg, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Breyer, Ken-
nedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter); Justices Stevens and Thomas dissented. See id. at 866, 873.
31. Id. at 870 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993)
(internal quotations omitted)).
32. According to Justice Ginsburg,
To establish the secondary-line injury of which it complains, Reeder had to show that
(1) the relevant Volvo truck sales were made in interstate commerce; (2) the trucks were
of "like grade and quality;" (3) Volvo "discriminated in price between" Reeder and an-
other purchaser of Volvo trucks; and (4) "the effect of such discrimination may be ... to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition" to the advantage of a favored purchaser, i.e., one
who "received the benefit of such discrimination."
33. Id.
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involves "[injury to] competition among the discriminating seller's cus-
tomers. 34
justice Ginsburg concluded Part II, moreover, by describing what a
secondary-line plaintiff must show to establish such competitive injury.
In this review, she did not state that a plaintiff had to show harm to mar-
ket-wide competition, nor that it had to demonstrate any of the familiar
components of such harm, such as market power, entry barriers, or ad-
verse effects on consumers. Instead, she declared that a "hallmark" of
that injury is "the diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored
purchaser to a favored purchaser. 3 5 She also reaffirmed the inference of
competitive injury established in Morton Salt, which allows a plaintiff to
satisfy its injury burden by showing a significant and persistent price
differential; a plaintiff need not prove actual injury to itself, nor harm to
market-wide competition. She stated: "We have also recognized that a
permissible inference of competitive injury may arise from evidence that
a favored competitor received a significant price reduction over a sub-
stantial period of time."36
In Part III of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg applied these standards
to Reeder's claims of competitive injury. She turned first to Reeder's
claim that it was hurt when the discounts it was offered on bids to supply
certain end users were lower than the discounts other Volvo dealers re-
ceived on bids to supply different end users. She rejected these compari-
sons because "in none of [these] instances ... did Reeder compete with
beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer.,37 Ab-
sent such head-to-head competition, she stated, Reeder and the other
Volvo dealers were not "competitors," and these instances could not
support a claim of competitive injury under the Act.
38
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged, though, that Reeder and the other
Volvo dealers did compete for invitations to bid. Since a dealer cannot
bid on a customer's business unless it receives an invitation to bid,
Reeder and the other dealers were competing for these invitations. If
34. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Ginsburg stated:
Our decisions describe three categories of competitive injury that may give rise to a Rob-
inson-Patman Act claim: primary-line, secondary-line, and tertiary-line. Primary-line
cases entail conduct ... that injures competition at the level of the discriminating seller
and its direct competitors. Secondary-line cases, of which this is one, involve price dis-
crimination that injures competition among the discriminating seller's customers (here,
Volvo's dealerships); cases in this category typically refer to "favored" and "disfavored"
purchasers.
Id. (citations omitted).
35.Id.
36. Id. (citing FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 49-51 (1948)).
37. Id. at 871. (Emphasis in original.)
38. Id. at 872.
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Reeder had acquired a reputation as an inferior supplier because Volvo
consistently gave other dealers better discounts, Reeder may have re-
ceived fewer invitations to bid. If so, Reeder might have had a valid
claim of competitive injury. Justice Ginsburg did not pursue this theory,
however, "because Reeder did not present--or even look for--evidence
that Volvo consistently disfavored Reeder while it consistently favored
certain other dealers." 39
Justice Ginsburg then evaluated Reeder's contention that it had
been injured in the two instances in which it actually bid against another
Volvo dealer for the business of a particular end user. In these instances,
Volvo and the Solicitor General argued there could be no Robinson-
Patman Act violation because the dealers were not competing resellers.
Once again, the Court left an opening for a disfavored dealer in a com-
petitive bidding situation, ruling that it "need not decide ... today" 40
whether Volvo's and the government's argument was correct. Instead,
the majority ruled in Volvo's favor because of flaws in Reeder's proof:
in one instance, Reeder did not actually lose a sale to another Volvo
dealer because the end user selected another brand of truck; in the second
instance, the lost sale would have enhanced Reeder's gross profits by
only $30,000, an amount too small by itself to satisfy the requirement of
"substantial" discrimination.41
Although Justice Ginsburg resolved Reeder's claims in Parts II and
III of her opinion, she did not stop there. Instead, she added in Part IV a
comment on the relationship between the Robinson-Patman Act and the
procompetitive policies of other antitrust laws.
2. Competition and the Robinson-Patman Act
In Part IV, the most provocative section of her opinion, Justice
Ginsburg asserted that the majority's decision was consistent with the
"broader policies of the antitrust laws. 42 Her beginning statement in Part
IV, that "[i]nterbrand competition.., is the 'primary concern of antitrust
law ... '", indicates that the policies she was referring to were the anti-
trust policies that promote competition in the market as a whole.43 To
39. Id. at 871 n.3.
40. Id. at 872.
41. Id. (citing I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 478-79
(5th ed. 2002) ("No inference of injury to competition is permitted when the discrimination is not
substantial.")).
42. Volvo, 126 S. C. at 873 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S.
209, 220 (1993)).
43. Id. at 872 (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977)).
Interbrand competition is competition between brands (e.g., between Volvo trucks and Freightliner
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support her assertion, she then identified three reasons why Volvo's con-
duct enhanced interbrand competition: "In the case before us, there is noevidence that any Eavored pue..ase. possessse i n".et power, the ae-"
edly favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large inde-
pendent department stores or chain operations, and the supplier's
selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers of
different brands." 4
What Justice Ginsburg did not say in Part IV is as important as
what she did say. As in Part II, she did not say that these characteristics
were hurdles that all future secondary-line plaintiffs had to surmount. In
particular, she did not declare that all future plaintiffs had to show that
the favored buyers had market power or that the defendant's conduct re-
duced market-wide competition. Rather, she indicated that the Court
would look at the competitiveness of the defendant's conduct when the
Court had to choose between two permissible interpretations of the Act:
"Even if the Act's text could be construed in the manner urged by Reeder
and embraced by the Court of Appeals, we would resist interpretation
geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimula-
tion of competition."45 In other words, if the law is genuinely unclear-if
both the plaintiff and the defendant present reasonable interpretations of
it-the Court will select the interpretation that is more likely to promote
competition.
It appears, therefore, that Part IV is not a radical reconstruction of
the Act, but rather a pointed reaffirmation of the Court's desire to reject
interpretations of the Act that threaten to reduce competition. Although
Part IV does not indicate which interpretations of the Act are permissible
and which are not, the Court's endorsement of the traditional tests of
competitive injury strongly suggests that interpretations that eliminate
those tests would not be permissible.
The dissenters offered an entirely different perspective. In their
view, Reeder had not advocated an unreasonable or even an expansive
interpretation of the Act. Instead, Reeder had established an entirely tra-
ditional Robinson-Patman violation.
trucks), as opposed to competition within a brand (e.g., between Volvo dealers). Interbrand competi-
tion thus refers to competition in the market as a whole, often simply called "competition."
44. Id. at 872-73 (expressly concluding in the last clause of this sentence-"the supplier's
selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers of different brands"-that Volvo's
price discrimination enhanced market-wide competition).
45. Id. at 872. In the previous sentence, Justice Ginsburg had asserted that the "Robinson-
Patman Act signals no large departure from [the] main concern [of antitrust law]." Id. While this
assertion would be surprising standing alone, Justice Ginsburg followed it with the sentence just
quoted in text. This suggests she reasoned that the Act is not a "large departure" from the other anti-
trust laws because ambiguities in it must be resolved in ways that promote competition. She offered
no other explanation for the assertion.
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C. Dissenting Opinion
Writing for Justice Thomas and himself, Justice Stevens contended
that Reeder had introduced substantial evidence that Volvo "sought to
cut back its number of dealers' 46 and "frequently gave worse prices to
[Reeder] than to other regional dealers ' 47 in order to accomplish this
goal. According to the dissenters, the Court made most of this evidence
irrelevant by "adopting a novel, transaction-specific concept of competi-
tion, ' 48 which eliminates the "statutory protection in all but those rare
situations in which a prospective purchaser is negotiating with two Volvo
dealers at the same time. '49 This approach, Justice Stevens contended,"requires us to ignore the fact that competition among truck dealers is a
continuing war waged over time rather than a series of wholly discrete
events." 50 Even if the Act was unsound economic policy, as Justice
Stevens thought it was, the Court would have no excuse for "refusing to
adhere to the text of the Act.",51
While the dissenters criticized the majority for failing to apply the
Act to the competitive bidding contests at issue in Volvo, they did not
argue that the majority had ignored the Act's protectionist aim and sub-
stituted an injury to competition test for the Act's traditional competitive
injury test. Moreover, because both the majority and the dissenters fo-
cused primarily on injury to competitors rather than injury to market-
wide competition, neither opinion analyzed the competitive effects of
Volvo's conduct in any detail or set forth a general test for determining
whether conduct furthers market-wide competition. In contrast, an in-
creasing number of decisions over the last three decades have articulated
such a test, the consumer welfare test.
III. THE CONSUMER WELFARE TEST
Ever since the Supreme Court's suggestion in 1979 that the
Sherman Act is a "consumer welfare prescription, 53 courts have been
stating with growing frequency that the overarching goal of antitrust laws
46. Id. at 874 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 873.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 876
51. Id. Justice Stevens agreed with Judge Bork that the Act's protectionist mission amounted to
"wholly mistaken economic theory." Id. (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 382 (1978)).
52. To the contrary, Justice Stevens stated: "As the Court recognizes, the Robinson-Patman Act
was primarily intended to protect small retailers from the vigorous competition afforded by chain-
stores and other large volume purchasers. " Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
53. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978)).
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(other than the Robinson-Patman Act) is consumer welfare. Many courts
have also indicated that conduct is procompetitive if it benefits consum-
ers and anticompetitive if it harms them. Overall, a consensus is emerg-
ing among the courts that the ultimate test for determining whether a
practice promotes market-wide competition is its impact on consumers in
the
relevant market.
In Brooke Group, for example, the Supreme Court refused to follow
its most recent primary-line precedent because its "low standards of
competitive injury are at odds with the antitrust laws' traditional concern
with consumer welfare and price competition." 54 The Court also refused
to condemn non-predatory price cutting, even if it resulted in prices be-
low marginal cost, because such low prices are generally a "boon to con-
sumers." 55 The Court's emphasis on consumer welfare led the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in its first predatory pricing case after Brooke Group, to hold that "a
primary-line plaintiff must demonstrate an injury flowing from an aspect
of the defendant's conduct injurious to consumer welfare. 56
Numerous other decisions have also identified consumer welfare as
the fundamental goal of antitrust laws and consumer impact as the ulti-
mate measure of whether a practice is procompetitive or anticompeti-
tive.5' For instance, in evaluating the reasonableness of conduct under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, the Seventh Circuit stated that "the focus of the
procompetitive justifications for the business practice remains the ulti-
mate consumer. To be judged anticompetitive, the agreement must actu-
ally or potentially harm consumers." 58 Additionally, in United States v.
Microsoft Corp., the Second Circuit formulated the first step in its test
for monopolizing conduct: "[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a
monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive effect.' That is, it must
harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. 59
Moreover, there appears to be no contrary view of the ultimate goal
of antitrust law that can be used to determine whether a practice reduces
competition. While courts frequently say that the purpose of antitrust law
is to protect competition, not competitors, 60 this statement does not de-
54. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993).
55. Id. at 224.
56. Rebel Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1446 (9th Cir. 1995).
57. For a much more extensive analysis of this issue-recent case law; the debate between
Bork and Lande; and the views of law professors, economists, and government agencies-see John
B. Kirkwood, Consumers, Economics, and Antitrust, 21 RES. L. & ECON., ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS I (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004).
58. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 1984).
59. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
60. See Kirkwood, supra note 57, at 30-31 (in a recent five-year period, 133 decisions used
this phrase). Justice Ginsburg reiterated this principle when she wrote that "we would resist interpre-
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fine competition; rather, it simply distinguishes competition from protec-
tionism. This statement says, for example, that antitrust law should not
protect competitors from price cuts that promote competition, but it does
not help us determine when price cuts promote competition. At present,
the only general test that can resolve the issue and that enjoys substantial
judicial support is the consumer welfare test.
There are, however, two potential exceptions to this test. The first
exception relates to the debate over whether consumer welfare should be
measured by the well-being of consumers in the relevant market or by
economic efficiency. 61 In the federal courts, that debate is largely over: in
instances where judges have confronted the issue, they have typically, if
not always, elevated the well-being of consumers in the relevant market
over economic efficiency. For example, in Brooke Group, the Court
measured consumer welfare by examining the impact on prices in the
relevant market, not by economic efficiency.62 The Court noted that un-
recouped below-cost pricing may lead to some "inefficient substitution,"
but nevertheless stated that it generally improved consumer welfare be-
cause it resulted in "lower aggregate prices in the market., 63 Likewise,
other courts have ruled that economic efficiencies cannot save an other-
wise anticompetitive merger unless the efficiencies are likely to be
passed on to consumers in the relevant market.64 Although a merger that
reduces cost but raises price can increase economic efficiency, numerous
judicial decisions have held that in evaluating a merger, the impact on
consumers in the market is decisive, not the impact on efficiency.65
The second exception relates to whether it is appropriate to examine
supplier welfare rather than consumer welfare in cases involving anti-
competitive practices by buyers rather than sellers. Where buyer conduct
tation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition."
Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860, 872 (2005).
61. In essence, economic efficiency measures the ability of a society to maximize the total
economic value it derives from its limited resources. See Kirkwood, supra note 56, at 2. When eco-
nomic efficiency is enhanced, consumers in the society as a whole benefit because everyone in the
society, including producers, is a consumer. In this sense, an improvement in economic efficiency-
in total social welfare-always improves consumer welfare. Id. at 47 n.l 1. As noted below, how-
ever, conduct that enhances total social welfare can harm consumers in the relevant market. Thus, if
the overarching goal of antitrust law generally is to protect consumers in the relevant market from
exploitation by firms with market power, economic efficiency is not the correct measure of con-
sumer welfare.
62. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (1 1th Cir. 1991); United States v.
United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1991).
65. See Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-
Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 761 n.93 (1999) (citing nine
court decisions and one FTC decision).
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clearly harms suppliers but does not benefit consumers, the impact on
suppliers should be dispositive. A buyer cartel, for example, may sharply
ireduce the price that suppliers receivc for thcir product, Ut ra n
discernible impact on the ultimate consumers. In such cases, courts tend
to focus on upstream injury, rather than injury to downstream consumers,
and hold that competition has been reduced when suppliers have been
hurt, even if consumers have not.66 In contrast, for some buy-side cases,
consumers may benefit even though suppliers are harmed; and in that
circumstance, at least one court has held that the impact on consumers
would be decisive. For instance, in Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Art-
ists Pictures Corp., the Sixth Circuit refused to hold as per se illegal an
agreement among film distributors to refrain from bidding against each
other for films because the agreement "may lower prices to moviegoers
at the box office and may serve rather than undermine consumer wel-
fare."67
In Volvo, the appropriate standard for evaluating the defendant's
conduct was consumer welfare, not supplier welfare. Volvo contained no
allegation that any dealer, or group of dealers, had engaged in a practice
likely to harm suppliers like Volvo. 68 Instead, Reeder claimed that Volvo
had engaged in discrimination in order to exploit some of its retail cus-
tomers and eliminate some of its dealers. Volvo stressed the downstream
consequences of its behavior, claiming that its conduct would increase
interbrand price competition and benefit consumers. Thus, to test
whether the Court was correct that Volvo's price discrimination en-
hanced competition, I will examine the impact of Volvo's conduct on the
well being of consumers in the relevant market.
IV. IMPACT OF VOLVO'S DISCRIMINATION ON CONSUMERS
As noted above, Reeder claimed that Volvo practiced price dis-
crimination to achieve two aims: exploit its most vulnerable customers
and eliminate its least desirable dealers. Volvo, however, claimed that it
discriminated in order to compete more effectively with other truck
manufacturers. These theories differ in their strength and in their impli-
cations for consumer welfare.
66. See, e.g., Telecor Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1133-34 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1031 (2003) ("The Supreme Court's treatment of monopsony cases
strongly suggests that suppliers ... are protected by antitrust laws even when the anti-competitive
activity does not harm end-users.").
67. 885 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 1989).
68. As Justice Ginsburg emphasized, there was no evidence that any favored dealer had market
power as a buyer. See discussion infra Part V.A. 1.
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A. Reeder's Theory of Consumer Harm:
Exploitative Price Discrimination
1. Elements of the Theory
Although the Court never mentioned it, Reeder actually advanced a
theory of consumer harm. In a footnote near the end of its brief, Reeder
pointed out that economists recognize that price discrimination can be
inefficient in certain cases. 69 Here, Reeder asserted, there were "strong
reasons to believe that price discrimination of the kind Volvo practices
[had] a negative effect on consumer welfare. 70 In support of this theory,
Reeder cited earlier portions of its own brief and the amicus brief of the
National Association of Automobile Dealers (NADA), and contended
that "Volvo's pricing practices are simply a form of haggling designed to
extract the highest possible price from a given retail truck customer.,
71
"By its own admission," Reeder continued, "the purpose of the conces-
sion methodology is to 'allow[] Volvo to sell at a higher profit to some-
one who will pay more.' 72
NADA's brief bolstered this argument. NADA noted that Volvo
claimed it would give a "larger discount for a retail customer that has
historically purchased a different brand of truck" and "offer an even
greater discount if that customer is expected to purchase a large number
of trucks in the future. 7 3 This meant, NADA declared, that "Volvo
would like to price discriminate against existing Volvo fleet owners and
against small fleet owners who cannot be 'expected to purchase a large
number of trucks in the future.'- 7 4 NADA also asserted that Volvo might
have the power to engage in such exploitation: "Volvo may be able to
price discriminate against existing Volvo fleet owners in the short term
because of the high costs to switch to another truck brand. 75 Reeder's
theory of consumer harm, in short, was that Volvo discriminated among
its dealers in order to discriminate among its retail customers, forcing the
most vulnerable of them to pay higher prices.
69. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 41 n.16, Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco
GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2005) (No. 04-905) [hereinafter Respondent Brief] (citing W. VISCUSI ET
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 286 (3d ed. 2000)).
70. Id.
71.Id. at8.
72. Id. at 9 (quoting from the record).
73. Brief of the National Automobile Dealers Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 24, Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2005)
(No. 04-905) [hereinafter NADA Brief].
74. NADA Brief, supra note 73, at 25 (quoting Brief for Petitioner Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc.
at 3, Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2005) (No. 04-905)).
75. Id.
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2. Defects in Reeder's Theory
Reeder's theory had two serious flaws. First, the theory did not ex-
piain why Volvo's discrimination made Volvo's retail customers worse
off overall. Even if Volvo had been charging supracompetitive prices to
some of its retail customers, Volvo was nevertheless charging lower
prices to others. Why did the losses to the former exceed the gains to the
latter? Volvo may have had more customers in the former category
(long-standing customers subject to switching costs), but why did these
customers lose more than other customers gained (customers who re-
ceived lower prices for switching to Volvo)? To show an adverse effect
on Volvo's retail customers as a whole, Reeder might have tried to prove
that Volvo's price discrimination caused its customers as a group to pay
a higher average price for its trucks than they would have paid had Volvo
charged a uniform price. Reeder did not make such a showing-or
otherwise demonstrate an adverse effect on Volvo's customers as a
whole-perhaps explaining why Reeder placed its theory of consumer
harm in a footnote.76
The second flaw to Reeder's theory is that competition among
manufacturers may have severely limited Volvo's ability to engage in
exploitative price discrimination. In describing the heavy-duty truck in-
dustry, both Reeder and NADA maintained that interbrand competition
was vigorous. Reeder argued: "Because each manufacturer offers similar
commodities that perform the same essential function (e.g., hauling a
load from point A to B), Class 8 trucks are highly substitutable products,
and competition is keen and profit margins are thin in the Class 8 mar-
ket.",77 NADA concurred: "The heavy-duty truck market in the United
States is characterized by intense interbrand ... competition., 78
This competition, however, may not have completely precluded
Volvo from engaging in exploitative price discrimination. As NADA
contended, switching costs may have rendered existing Volvo fleet own-
ers vulnerable to some exploitation.79 Moreover, Volvo never argued that
its discrimination was cost-justified. If such a contention reflected the
underlying reality, rather than the practical difficulties of establishing the
cost-justification defense, then Volvo in fact had some market power. A
seller cannot ordinarily practice economic price discrimination-price
discrimination that is not based on cost differences-without some mar-
76. See Respondent Brief, supra note 69, at 41 n.16.
77. Id. at 5.
78. NADA Brief, supra note 73, at 6.
79. See id. at 25.
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ket power. Yet if interbrand competition had been intense, Volvo
would not have had significant market power and thus could not have
engaged in substantial customer exploitation. In an intensely competitive
environment, Volvo could not afford to gain a reputation for mistreating
81its repeat customers.
Reeder's theory of consumer exploitation was thus quite weak.
Reeder did not show that Volvo's price discrimination harmed its retail
customers as a whole, nor did Reeder explain how Volvo could have
harmed its customers significantly in light of the intense interbrand com-
petition that assertedly prevailed in the heavy duty truck market. In
contrast, Volvo and the Solicitor General argued that price discrimination
in this market actually benefited consumers.
B. Volvo's Rejoinder: Selective Discounting Benefits Consumers
1. Uniform Pricing: A Cure Worse than the Disease
Both Volvo and the Solicitor General asserted that price discrimina-
tion by truck manufacturers improved the well being of consumers be-
cause the alternative-prohibiting manufacturers from discriminating
among their dealers-would impede the ability of manufacturers to en-
gage in interbrand price competition. The Solicitor General stated:
"Imposing liability for differences in concessions offered to dealers bid-
ding on different sales would limit suppliers' ability to tailor prices to the
competitive situation, and thus diminish the vigor of interbrand price
competition., 82 Volvo made the same point: "Economists and antitrust
scholars have long recognized that competition is generally harmed, and
consumers are made worse off, if manufacturers cannot selectively
discount their products. 83
80. The leading antitrust economics textbook defines "price discrimination" as nonuniform
pricing that is not due to cost differences. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 308 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter "Carlton & Perloff'] ("Not all
nonuniform pricing is due to price discrimination; some is due to cost differences."). Ordinarily,
such economic price discrimination requires market power. See, e.g., id. at 294 (for successful price
discrimination, a "firm must have some market power (the ability to set price above marginal cost
profitably)"); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 574 (3d ed. 2005) ("[Plersistent price discrimination requires that a seller (or
group of sellers) have at least some market power.").
81. Reeder and NADA may have exaggerated the degree of interbrand competition, however,
in order to dramatize the impact of Volvo's discrimination on Reeder. Since Reeder mainly com-
peted with dealers for other manufacturers, it was more likely to be hurt if interbrand competition
was intense.
82. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27, Volvo Trucks N.
Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860 (2005) (No. 04-905) [hereinafter U.S. Brief].
83. Petitioner Brief, supra note 22, at 24.
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This argument was valid. With the manufacture of heavy-duty
trucks concentrated in five or six manufacturers,84 there was a real risk
that OligOpOlistic courdinaiuss would be esthanued if selctive discoutIL-
ing were banned.85 Therefore, even if Reeder's theory of exploitative
discrimination were correct, the cure may have been worse than the dis-
ease. By strengthening oligopolistic coordination, a ban on discrimina-
tion could raise the average price level in the market, making Volvo's
retail customers as a whole worse off. While some customers might
benefit from uniform pricing, overall consumer welfare could fall. 8 6
Reeder attempted to minimize the significance of Volvo's selective
discounting by pointing out that "Volvo conceded at trial that it knew the
actual prices competitors were offering to customers only in 10-15% of
its transactions. 87 However, Volvo did not need to know its rivals' exact
offers to undercut them. Volvo could simply use price cuts to gain busi-
ness if it had a "general sense of market prices for competitive trucks," as
Reeder acknowledged Volvo had.88 Moreover, Reeder's contention that
Volvo rarely engaged in price competition was inconsistent with its
claim that "Class 8 trucks are highly substitutable products, and
competition is keen and profits margins are thin in the Class 8 market., 89
84. See id. at 2; NADA Brief, supra note 72, at 6.
85. In an oligopoly-a market dominated by a few firms-supracompetitive pricing is less
likely if the firms engage in selecting discounting. Not only do selective price cuts lower the average
price level in the market, but they are a form of "cheating" on the oligopolistic consensus that weak-
ens the consensus and may destroy it altogether. As a result, a ban on selective discounting is likely
to strengthen oligopolistic coordination, diminish interbrand price competition, and (in the absence
of countervailing effects from the elimination of exploitative price discrimination) raise average
price levels in the market. E.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 14 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 122 (1999) (stating that
[I]n situations in which collusion or oligopoly already exists, the Robinson-Patman Act
often serves to preserve rather than undermine it. This is so because firms typically
'cheat' on cartels or oligopolies by making relatively large sales at prices below the level
that the parties have otherwise settled on. To that end, the Robinson-Patman Act...
makes a selective price cut more expensive by requiring that the cut be given to other
customers as well.... Faced with such a situation, the firm will likely refrain from mak-
ing the cut at all, with the result that the oligopoly is maintained.).
86. If a ban on price discrimination resulted in a uniform market price that was above the aver-
age price that prevailed when selective discounting was permitted, the ban would raise the average
price level in the market and consumers as a whole would be worse off. The retail customers that
paid the highest prices under discrimination might still benefit, however, if the uniform price was
below the price they previously paid.
87. Respondent Brief, supra note 69, at 9.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 5.
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2. The Court Accepts Volvo's Theory
The majority agreed with Volvo and the Solicitor General that
Volvo's price discrimination enhanced interbrand competition. The
Court not only noted that Volvo's "selective price discounting fosters
competition among suppliers of different brands," ' but also quoted a
prior admonition the Court had given against construing the Act in ways
that "extend beyond the prohibitions of the Act and, in doing so, help
give rise to a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the pur-
poses of other antitrust legislation."9 ' Justice Ginsburg did not, however,
attempt to weigh Volvo's theory against Reeder's, asking whether the
costs of reduced interbrand competition, if Volvo could not price dis-
criminate, would outweigh the benefits from reduced exploitative price
discrimination. Presumably, she did not make this tradeoff for the same
reason she did not mention Reeder's theory: it was poorly substanti-
ated.92 Comparing the strength of Volvo's theory of consumer benefit
against the weakness of Reeder's theory of consumer harm, it was rela-
tively easy for the Court to conclude that Volvo's price discrimination
improved consumer welfare. At oral argument, moreover, Justice Breyer
identified another reason why Volvo's discrimination benefited consum-
ers: it probably increased Volvo's distributional efficiency.
C. Justice Breyer's Focus. Distributional Efficiency
1. Reeder's Theory of Dealer Harm
As noted above, Reeder claimed that Volvo engaged in price dis-
crimination not only to exploit vulnerable retail customers, but also to
eliminate unwanted dealers. Volvo's desire to pare back its dealership
network was evident, as Reeder pointed out: "In the period relevant to
this case, Volvo adopted a policy called 'Volvo Vision' to eliminate
smaller dealers. Volvo's goal was . . . to reduce the number of dealers by
roughly 50%. . . . The existence of this policy was not in dispute.94
The issue was whether Volvo could use price discrimination to effectuate
it.
90. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 873.
91. Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953). See also Volvo, 126 S. Ct.
at 873 (citing Automatic Canteen Co, 346 U.S. at 63).
92. As a small business, Reeder may not have had the resources to develop and prove a con-
vincing theory of consumer harm.
93. Respondent Brief, supra note 69, at 10 (citation omitted).
94. See Petitioner Brief, supra note 22, at 8 (noting, but not disputing, Reeder's evidence that
Volvo had adopted a business strategy called "Volvo Vision").
[Vol. 30:349
Robinson-Patman Act and Consumer Welfare
Ordinarily, of course, a manufacturer can simply terminate dealers
it does not want. According to Reeder, this route was not available to
Volvo, forcing it to turn to price discrimination:
Volvo was constrained by its self-renewing franchise agreement,
which prevented termination of the franchise except for cause, from
simply refusing to deal with a targeted dealer. Moreover, even aside
from Volvo's binding and voluntary contractual commitments, fed-
eral and state law both prohibit termination of dealerships without
cause. Volvo, however, could terminate dealers for failing to makes
their sales and other objectives .... Thus, price discrimination was a
powerful way for Volvo to manufacture "cause" to terminate un-
wanted dealers. 9
5
Reeder's theory, in short, was that Volvo engaged in price dis-
crimination in order to evade contractual and statutory restrictions on its
ability to cut off dealers. At oral argument, however, Justice Breyer
summarily dismissed this theory.
2. Breyer's Assessment: Proconsumer
Justice Breyer pounced on Reeder's dealer-elimination theory at
oral argument because he thought that it simply showed that Volvo
wanted to improve the efficiency of its dealer network and thereby bene-
fit consumers. While he agreed that Reeder's theory probably explained
Volvo's behavior, he thought that its implications were plainly procom-
petitive: "[W]hat worries me . . . is . . . forbidding Volvo from doing
what it probably wants to do here. If it wants to get rid of its dealers, it's
because it wants to compete better with other brands. And that means
lower prices for consumers, though individual dealers might be hurt., 9 6 If
Reeder's counsel disagreed, he did not say so on the record. In the collo-
quy that followed, he did not offer any reason why the "Volvo Vision," if
carried out, would harm consumers. 97
3. The Court's Concurrence With Breyer's Evaluation
The Court also rejected Reeder's dealer-elimination theory. In a
footnote in Part IV of the opinion, the majority concurred with Justice
Breyer that Volvo's strategy was procompetitive and stated that the Rob-
inson-Patman Act would not prohibit it: "The dissent assails Volvo's
decision to reduce the number of its dealers. But Robinson-Patman does
not bar a manufacturer from restructuring its distribution networks to
95. Respondent Brief, supra note 69, at 10-11 (citations omitted).
96. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Volvo, 126 S. Ct. 860 (2005) (No. 04-905).
97. See id at 41-44.
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improve the efficiency of its operations." 98 Instead, the plaintiff would
have to seek other remedies: "If Volvo did not honor its obligation to
Reeder as its franchisee, '[a]ny remedy . . . lies in state laws addressing
unfair competition and the rights of franchisees, not in the Robinson-
Patman Act."' 99 All the Justices in the majority concluded, in short, that
Volvo's desire to shrink the size of its dealership network was beneficial
for competition and consumers.
D. Overall Evaluation of Volvo 's Behavior
The Court's conclusion in Part IV of its opinion was almost cer-
tainly correct. It appears highly likely that Volvo's selective discounting
improved consumer welfare and thus enhanced market-wide competition.
Reeder's theory of consumer harm (exploitative price discrimination)
was inadequately supported and inconsistent with its claim that inter-
brand competition was intense. In contrast, the theories of consumer
benefit advanced by Volvo, the government, and Justice Breyer (inter-
brand price competition and distributional efficiency) were more fully
developed and more likely to be true. In addition, as noted below, Reeder
never showed that Volvo's discrimination was induced by powerful buy-
ers. 100 As a result, while buyer-induced discrimination can harm consum-
ers in several ways, there was no basis for concluding that any of these
harms had occurred in Volvo. 0 1 The majority had good reason to want to
protect Volvo's behavior.
V. THE MEANING OF VOLVO
The larger question presented by Volvo is whether the Court not
only rejected Reeder's claim, but also substantially cut back the scope of
the Act. To analyze that question, it is helpful to focus initially on one
aspect of the Court's opinion: buyer power. In both its legal analysis of
Reeder's claims and its economic assessment of Volvo's conduct, the
Court stressed Reeder's failure to show buyer power. As I explain in
Section A, it is possible to derive most of the significance of Volvo by
analyzing the Court's treatment of buyer power. In Section B, I consider
other factors and offer an overall appraisal of the decision.
98. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 873 n.4 (citations omitted).
99. Id. (quoting U.S. Brief, supra note 82, at 28).
100. See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
101. See discussion infra Parts V.A.2 & V.A.3.
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A. Buyer Power
1. Important to the Court
The Court repeatedly pointed out that Reeder had not shown that
Volvo's discrimination was driven by powerful buyers. In explaining
why this conduct was procompetitive, Justice Ginsburg twice cited the
absence of buyer power, noting that "there is no evidence that any
favored purchaser possesses market power" 10 2 and that "the allegedly
favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large independ-
ent department stores or chain operations."'10 3 Earlier in the opinion, she
referred to powerful buyers two additional times, noting that the Act was
directed at them yet they were missing from the case. By passing the Act,
she observed, "Congress sought to target the perceived harm to competi-
tion occasioned by powerfil buyers, rather than sellers.... ."04 In reject-
ing most of Reeder's evidence of discrimination, she wrote: "Here, there
is no discrete 'favored' dealer comparable to a chain store or a large in-
dependent department store. ,,05
The Court's references to the absence of systematic discrimination
also highlighted the absence of buyer power, since systematic discrimi-
nation is more likely when a few buyers have significant power. For in-
stance, the Court observed that Reeder had not shown that it was system-
atically disfavored compared to other Volvo dealers: "Reeder did not
present--or even look for-evidence that Volvo consistently disfavored
Reeder while it consistently favored certain other dealers. '0 6
2. Mixed Impact on Consumer Welfare
While the Court criticized Reeder for failing to show buyer power,
such power is not inevitably harmful to consumers. Powerful buyers fre-
quently improve consumer welfare when they wield their bargaining
power to extract concessions from suppliers and then pass on those con-
cessions to consumers. The Antitrust Section's Monograph on the Robin-
son-Patman Act states: "[P]rices may be made more fluid and the general
price level in the market lowered if ... major purchasers can use their
countervailing power to force producers to grant price concessions."',0 7
102. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 873.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 869.
105. Id. at 87 1.
106. Id. at 872 n.3. See also id at 868, 871.
107. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 4, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
POLICY AND LAW 29 (Paul H. LaRue et al., eds. 1980).
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At other times, as the Court indicated, buyer power can reduce
competition, and thereby harm suppliers, consumers, or both. Such re-
duction and resulting harm is clearest when a powerful buyer exercises
monopsony power, thus exploiting upstream suppliers and, to the extent
it restricts output, driving up prices to downstream consumers.10 8 Con-
sumer welfare may also be reduced when a powerful buyer exerts its
bargaining power to obtain a discriminatory concession that is not cost
justified. In comments to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, the
American Antitrust Institute Working Group on the Robinson-Patman
Act explained how this can occur. Initially, the Group identified three
ways in which a persistent, non-cost-justified discrimination induced by
a large buyer can harm consumers directly:
First, it can allow the favored buyer to take business or profits from
disfavored buyers, reducing their number or vigor and depriving
consumers of the convenient locations, distinctive services, superior
selection, or other attractive features they would have offered. If
consumers who value those features lose more than other consumers
gain from the lower prices (or other enhanced offerings) offered by
the favored firm, non-cost-justified discrimination has reduced con-
sumer welfare.
Second, a lower price induced by a large buyer may lead to higher
consumer prices if the large buyer uses its unjustified advantage to
gain so much market share that it acquires market power as a seller.
It can then raise prices to consumers, so long as its unjustified ad-
vantage or other circumstances create a barrier to entry and expan-
sion. The same result can occur if several buyers exact unjustified
concessions and use them to acquire shared market power. In short,
secondary-line violations may produce higher prices if they increase
concentration in product markets and enable the favored buyers to
exercise market power, either individually or collectively.
Third, buyer-induced non-cost-justified discrimination may result in
higher prices to consumers when a powerful buyer induces sellers to
discriminate not by lowering their prices to the favored buyer, but
by raising them to other buyers. By forcing up its rivals' costs, the
108. See John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group
Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 625, 636 (2005) (monopsony power-the mirror image of monopoly power-means the power
of a buyer to profitably depress the price of an input below the competitive level) [hereinafter
"Kirkwood II"]. See also id. at 653, 663-64 (describing the effects of monopsony power on suppliers
and consumers).
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favored buyer can, in the presence of entry9 barriers, acquire market
power as a seller and raise its own prices.
Then, the Group noted two ways in which unjustified buyer-induced dis-
crimination may harm consumers indirectly:
Fourth, buyer-induced discrimination may harm consumers by al-
lowing the favored buyer to become less efficient. Because an un-
justified concession confers a competitive advantage on the favored
buyer, it can use that concession to shelter itself from competition,
permitting it to survive when its costs are excessive. These inflated
costs not only waste resources, but tend to make the favored firm
less innovative and less responsive to changing consumer tastes.
Fifth, unjustified discrimination induced by large buyers may harm
consumer welfare by reducing the profitability of suppliers and
causing them to curtail their investment in the industry. This is most
likely to harm consumers if the suppliers were not making excess
profits prior to the unjustified discrimination. In that case, future in-
vestment may be less than optimal and consumers may eventually
pay higher prices or have fewer choices. 110
Thus, in five scenarios, an unjustified discrimination induced by a
powerful buyer may harm consumers and reduce competition.
3. Consumer Harm Not Required
In Volvo, the anticompetitive scenarios just described were not at
issue because Reeder had not shown that any of the favored buyers had
enough power to cause them. The Court did not recognize, however, that
Volvo's discrimination could still have been anticompetitive since, as
Reeder argued, even purely seller-driven price discrimination can harm
consumers. When a seller discriminates among its customers by charging
some higher prices than others, the losses to the consumers who pay
higher prices may exceed the gains to the consumers who pay lower
prices. The absence of buyer power, in short, was no guarantee that
Volvo's discrimination was procompetitive.
The Court similarly did not ask whether the presence of powerful
buyers could have improved consumer welfare. When powerful buyers
force oligopolistic sellers to grant concessions that would not otherwise
have extended and then pass these concessions on to consumers, con-
109. THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SHOULD BE
REFORMED, NOT REPEALED, COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORKING
GROUP ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 13-14 (2005), available at http://www.antitrust
institute.org/recent2/425.pdf.
110. Id. at 14.
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sumers will be better off in the short run and are frequently better off in
the long run as well."1 In Volvo, where there was a significant risk of
oligopoly pricing,' users of trucks may well have benefited had some
dealers been large and powerful. The Court's failure to note this possibil-
ity-well-recognized in the antitrust literature" 3 -may suggest that the
majority was less interested in the economic consequences of buyer
power than its legal role. Buyer power is significant legally because it is
a component of the classic secondary-line violation, the type of violation
that most concerned Congress. 14 By emphasizing buyer power, the
Court may have wanted to signal that future secondary-line plaintiffs
should not be allowed to succeed unless they show buyer power. As the
next section indicates, however, this seems unlikely.
It is more probable that the Court did not explore the possible ef-
fects of buyer power on consumer welfare because the Court was not
willing to create a consumer harm requirement. Justice Ginsburg did not
say that future secondary-line plaintiffs must establish harm to consum-
ers, nor did she criticize older cases that did not require such proof."5
Had the Court intended to take such a radical step-eliminating the con-
flict between the Act and other antitrust laws-it would almost certainly
have spelled out the proof requirements for future plaintiffs. Since the
Court did not set forth standards for determining when buyer power hurts
consumers and when it benefits them, the Court probably did not expect
future plaintiffs to make such a distinction.
It seems more likely that the majority emphasized buyer power in
order to highlight the difference between Reeder's case and the classic
secondary-line case. Buyer-induced discrimination was the type of favor-
itism that most animated Congress, since harm to small business is most
likely to occur-and most likely to be substantial and persistent-when
the favored buyer is powerful. Stressing the absence of buyer power was
a way for the Court to point out how far Reeder's case was from the sec-
ondary-line offenses of greatest concern to Congress and small business.
111. See Kirkwood II, supra note 108, at 645-47.
112. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
113. See, e.g., Kirkwood II, supra note 108, at 646-47. Cf Carlton & Perloff, supra note 79, at
675 ("One consequence of the Robinson-Patman Act is higher prices to consumers, who are de-
prived of the benefits of economies of scale in purchasing that the chain stores would otherwise be
forced by competition (among themselves) to pass along to consumers.").
114. See Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 869. Justice Ginsburg referred to this classic violation as the
"chain-store paradigm," id. at 871, because Congress was responding "to the advent of large chain
stores, enterprises with the clout to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers could de-
mand." Id. at 869.
115. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990); Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco
Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428 (1983).
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4. Buyer Power Not Required Either
Despite its stress on buyer power, the Court never declared that
secondary-line injury can only be caused by a powerful buyer. While the
majority made clear that it is unlikely to adopt an expansive construction
of the Act if the plaintiff cannot show buyer power, it never stated that
even when a plaintiff brings a traditional case-showing two sales, com-
parable products, competing resellers, diverted business, and so on-it
cannot prevail unless it also demonstrates that the favored purchaser had
buyer power. To the contrary, in reviewing the elements of competitive
injury, Justice Ginsburg did not mention either consumer harm or buyer
power.1 6 Instead, she wrote that a "hallmark of the requisite competitive
injury ... is the diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored purchaser
to a favored purchaser."' 117 She even endorsed the Morton Salt inference,
which does not require proof of diverted sales or profits, much less
consumer harm or buyer power.
Similarly, in the Court's most recent secondary-line cases, Texaco
Inc. v. Hasbrouck'19 and Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage,
Inc., 2 ° the Court did not adopt either a consumer harm or a buyer power
requirement. Indeed, in Falls City, the Court expressly rejected a buyer
power test: "Although concerns about the excessive market power of
large purchasers were primarily responsible for passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act, [the text of the Act] is of general applicability and prohibits
discriminations generally."' 2 Finally, in Volvo, the Court did not
criticize Hasbrouck, Falls City, Morton Salt, or any other decision that
allowed a plaintiff to establish competitive injury without proving buyer
power or consumer harm.
B. Overall Appraisal
While it seems clear that the Court did not adopt either a consumer
harm or a buyer power requirement in Volvo, the majority opinion does
contain language that could be read in isolation to suggest that future
Robinson-Patman plaintiffs must establish an adverse effect on market-
wide competition. The Court declared that "the Act proscribes 'price dis-
crimination only to the extent that it threatens to injure competition,"", 
22
116. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860, 869-70
(2006).
117. Id. at 870.
118. See id.
119.496 U.S. 543 (1990).
120. 460 U.S. 428 (1983).
121. Id. at 436 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
122. Volvo, 126 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S.
209, 220 (1993)).
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and it asserted that the "Act signals no large departure" from the "main
concern" of antitrust law, namely interbrand competition. 2 3 It also added
an entire section to its opinion in order to emphasize that Volvo's dis-
crimination was procompetitive and that it would "resist interpretation
geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimula-
tion of competition., 24
As a whole, however, Volvo does not appear to reconcile the Act
with other antitrust laws by requiring secondary-line plaintiffs to show
harm to market-wide competition and consumer welfare. As explained
above, the first two statements are tempered by their context in the opin-
ion, and all the Court's references to market-wide competition are tem-
pered by Parts II and III, which set forth the standards for showing
competitive injury in a secondary-line case and apply them to Reeder
without mentioning either a buyer power or a consumer-harm require-
ment. It appears, therefore, that the function of Part IV is more limited: it
indicates, as the Court has indicated before, that ambiguities in the Act
should be resolved in ways that promote competition. 125
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to read Volvo as a radical shift in Robinson-Patman
Act law, imposing a requirement that all secondary-line plaintiffs must
show buyer power and a significant threat to consumer welfare. Had the
Court intended to make such a major change in traditional law, one
would have expected it to be clear. Written by the careful Justice Gins-
burg, the majority opinion seems to convey a more modest message, a
message the Court has communicated before-that issues of Robinson-
Patman Act interpretation must be resolved in light of the competition
policies and consumer orientation of other antitrust laws. While Volvo
adds considerable weight to that message, the Court does not appear
willing to disregard the fundamental features of the Act Congress passed
in 1936.126
123. Id. at 872.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 873 (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S. 209 (1993);
Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. FTC, 346
U.S. 61 (1953)).
126. See Foreman and Skitol, supra note 5, at 5, who argue that
[t]he Court's sharp distinction between competitive bidding/special order situations and
'the chain-store paradigm,' under which competing dealers resell goods from inventory,
suggest the opinion offers no comfort for discriminatory pricing in the latter garden-
variety circumstances under which most [Robinson-Patman] cases have arisen over the
course of the past 70 years and will continue to arise in many industries over the years
ahead.
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In contrast, Richard Steuer suggests at one point that Volvo held that secondary-line plaintiffs
must prove both buyer power and harm to market-wide competition: "The majority ... did hold that
unless the favored purchaser possesses market power, the discrimination is substantial, and the effect
on interbrand competition is substantial, the requisite injury to competition is not established .... "
Steuer, supra note 8, at 64. In fact, the holding of the case is more limited. See supra Part I1. See also
Foreman and Skitol, supra note 5, at I ("the holding is narrow," applying to "'competitive bidding'
and 'special order' situations, as opposed to far more common situations of dealers reselling stan-
dardized goods from their own inventories"). Later, Steuer offers a more measured interpretation:
"Volvo teaches that the Robinson-Patman Act has come another step closer to being harmonized
with the rest of the antitrust laws." Steuer, supra note 8, at 67.
